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SEMINAR
THE VALIDITY OF A MARRIAGE UNDER THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS
"Marriage lies at the bottom of all government".
CONFUCIUS: The Book of Rites, XXIV (500 B. C.)
The major problem in regard to the marriage relationship
itself, so far as it will arise in the area of conflict of laws, is
that of validity. Is a marriage celebrated in North Dakota
valid in Alabama? Which law is applicable to determine valid-
ity? These are the questions with which this paper will be con-
cerned.
The problem itself is likely to arise under three general sit-
uations: (1) when an action for divorce, separation or annul-
ment is commenced; (2) in probate proceedings, when a claim
is made as widow or widower of the decedent; (3) when a
criminal action for desertion, nonsupport, bigamy, adultery,
or illicit cohabitation is brought against one or both of the sup-
posed spouses. Under these situations the problem loses the ab-
stract character it might assume under a latin phrased conflict
of laws rule and becomes very real indeed.
THE RELATIONSHIP DEFINED
Necessarily, in any attempt at analysis of a legal relation-
ship we must start by defining our terms. Marriage, a com-
plex human relation at best, when viewed from its legal aspect
alone has been variously defined as: a contract,1 an institu-
tion 2 a status. 3 An example of legal analysis carried to a
doubtful conclusion is the definition of the early rationalistic
school. They defined marriage as a partnership, the object of
which was the begetting of children.4 However, in choosing
among these definitions it should be explained that the civil
contract analysis is the traditional common law approach fol-
lowed since Blackstone. 5 The concept of marriage as a status
6
1. El. g. Bailey v. State, 36 Neb. 808, 55 N.W. 241 (1893).; STORY, CON-
FLICTS OF LAW § 108 (8th ed. 1883).
2. U. g. Wis. Stat. Ann. Family Code § 245.
3. El. g. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICTS OF LAW § 119, comment (1934).
4. JACOBS AND GOEBEL, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 44 (4th ed. 1961).
5. 1 BLAICKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 433 (Lewis ed. 1897).
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is the more modern approach taken by the Restatement.
Even among that great majority of American jurisdictions
tying their concept of marriage to the civil contract analogy
it has been found necessary to broaden the definition to in-
clude the public interest, or the interest of the state, in the
marriage relation.7 In effect this means three parties must be
considered to have corresponding interests: the husband, the
wife, and the state. For practical purposes the analysis of Mr.
Clad appears most accurate: "In reality, it is something of a
combination between a statute and a contract, if we must press
it into the mold of some specific legal concept."" In viewing
marriage in this manner we are taking into account both its
consensual nature and the third party interest which is in-
volved.
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS RULE
The traditional concept of marriage has carried over into
its application in the conflict of laws and the consistent state-
ment of the rule is that a marriage valid where contracted is
valid everywhere-the lex loci contractus.9 In like manner the
converse may be applied holding marriages invalid where
performed invalid everywhere. 10
An example of the rule as it is so often judicially stated is
the following from the Virginia Supreme Court:
"[T] he general rule is that a marriage valid where per-
formed is valid everywhere; but there are exceptions to
the rule as well established as the rule itself. These ex-
ceptions are generally embraced in two classes: First,
marriages deemed contrary to the law of nature as gen-
erally recognized in Christian countries, and include only
those that are void for polygamy or incest; second, mar-
6. "* . . a legal personal relationship, not temporary in its nature norterminable at the mere will of the parties, with which third persons and
the state are concerned." RESTATEMENT, CONFLICTS OF LAW § 119(1934),.
7. Willits v. Willits, 76 Neb. 228, 107 N.W. 379, 380-381 (1906) "While
our law defines marriage as a civil contract, it differs from all other con-tracts in its far-reaching consequences to the body politic itself, and for
that reason in dealing with it or the status resulting therefrom, the state
never stands indifferent but is always a party whose interest must be
taken into account."; Ritzer v. Ritzer, 243 Mich. 406, 220 N.W. 812, 813(1928) "While marriage is In a very important sense a contract, it Is also
a relation governed by the rules of public policy which apply to no mere
private agreements."
8. CLAD, AMERICANLAW INSTITUTE-FAMILY LAW 3 (1958).9. E. g., McDonald v. McDonald, 5 Cal.2d 457, 58 P.2d 163 (1936); Hills v.State, 61 Neb. 589, 85 N.W. 836 (1901); STORY, CONFLICTS OF LAW §
113 (8th ed. 1883).
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riages forbidden by statute because contrary to the public
policy of the state.""
It remains to be biologically proven that the "laws of nature"
vary from Christian to non-Christian countries. However, the
greater criticism of the rule lies in its second exception. The
concept of local public policy tends to be the overriding area
for judicial nullification of foreign marriages and this is a
nebulous and uncertain concept. The Restatement has attempt-
ed to restrict its use by limiting it, in certain cases, to "strong
public policy" l.12
While it has not yet had a major impact upon judicial deci-
sion, a substituted approach has found strong advocates among
authorities in this field of conflict of laws.13 These writers
would apply the law of the "intended marital domicile" to de-
termine validity. Under this concept the law of one state alone
should be applicable for such a determination as to any given
marriage. There should be no questions of conflict between
state policies rendering a marriage valid in one jurisdiction
invalid in another. The rule bears much in common with the
"substantial connection" or "points of contact" doctrine,
which is the modern approach to contracts in the conflict of
laws.1 4 Both of these approaches rely upon the law of that jur-
isdiction in which the legal relation has the greatest effect.
APPLICATION OF THE RULE
Having examined the rule itself we can best test its success
by considering the situations in which it is applied. The great
majority of problems arising where foreign marriages are
questioned may be grouped under eight headings.
(1) The miscegenous marriage.
(2) The incestual marriage.
(3) The polygamous marriage.
(4) The common law marriage.
10. Schaffer v. Krestovnidow, 88 N.J.Eq. 192, 102 Atl. 246 (1917); Huard
v. MeTeigh, 113 Ore. 279, 232 Pac. 658 (1925); Kitzman v. Kitzman, 167
Wis. 308, 166 N.W. 789 (19183; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §
122 (1934); see also Lariviere v. Lariviere, 102 Vt. 278, 147 Atl. 700 (1929).
11. Heflinger V. Heflinger, 136 Va. 289, 118 S.E. 316, 320 (1923).
12. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 132 & comment (1934).
13. Taintor, Marriage in the Conflict of Laws, 9 Vand. L. Rev. 607 (1956);
CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 305, 320 (5th ed. 1957).
14. See Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of
Laws, 30 Yale L.J. 655 (1921); 2 RABEL, CONFLICT OF LAWS 480 (1947);
GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 328-329 (3rd ed. 1949). An adaptation of
this view is expressed in RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONTRACTS § 332
et. seq. (Tent. Draft no. 6, 1960).
[Vol. 38
VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE
(5) The proxy marriage and marriage by correspondence.
(6) Marriage contrary to a eugenics or health restriction
statute.
(7) Remarriage contrary to a restrictive divorce decree or
statute.
(8) Marriage by parties not of legal age.
The problem may be narrowed somewhat by noting that
domicil is intrinsically tied to the marriage relationship under
Anglo-American law. So far as can be ascertained, no Ameri-
can court has applied its law to invalidate an extra-state mar-
riage where the parties, at the time of the marriage, did not
intend to and did not live in the state of the forum.15 The
typical decision turns upon a situation where a resident or res-
idents of the forum marry out of state and immediately re-
turn. The court of the forum is later called upon to determine
the validity of the marriage.
Also excluded from consideration are the marriage licensing
statutes and the effect of noncompliance since these statutes
appear to be universally construed as directory only and not
a basis for invalidating a marriage, or are construed to have
no extra-territorial effect. 16 The courts feel the compulsive
force of these statutes is effected merely through their penal
provisions. 1
7
Miscegenous Marriages. A surprising total of twenty-four
states retain statutory and constitutional restrictions upon in-
terracial marriage.- The strong cultural feelings expressed by
15. See Taintor, supra note 13, at 613 where he makes the same ob-
servation as of that date.
16. Lyannes v. Lyannes, 177 Wis. 381, 177 N.W. 683 (1920); Noble v.
Noble, 299 Mich. 565, 300 N.W. 885 (1941); see generally Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d
847 (1958). Under English law marriage by license is recognized as an al-
ternative form of marriage and the requirement is mandatory. In Europe
the requirement of publishing banns takes the place of license require-
ments. Mueller, International Choice of Law to Determine the Validity of
Marriages, 2 Howard LJ. 21, 24 (1956).
17. E. g., N.D. Cent. Code § 14-03-25 "Every person who attempts to
join in marriage or to perform the marriage ceremony for another
within this state without being authorized by law so to do shall be pun-
ished as provided in section 14-03-28." ($50 to $500, or 30 days to one year,
or both).
18. Ala. Code Ann. 14 § 360, 361 (1958), Const. vol. 1, § 102; Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 25-101(a) (1956); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 55-104 (1947); Del. Code
Ann. 13 § 101(a) (1953); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 741.11 to 15 (1940), Const. Art. 16
§ 25; Ga. Code Ann. § 53-106 (1961); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 44-104, 105 (1958); Ky.
Rev. Stat. § 402. 020(2) (1959); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:201, § 14:79 (1950);
Md. Code Ann. 27 §§ 393, 398; 62 § 16 (1957); Mich. Comp. Laws § 551.6
(1948); Miss. Code Ann. § 459 (1956) Const. 263 §§ 2339, 2002; Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 451.020 (1952); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-103 (1960); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 51-3
(1950); Okla. Stat. 43 § 12 (1951); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 106.210 (1959); S.C. Code
§ 20-7 (1952); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-402, 403 (1955); Tex. Civ. Stat Ann.
4607, P.C. 492-495 (1960); Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-2 (1953); Va. Code Ann. §§
20-54, 57 (1960); W.Va. Code Ann. § 4697 (1961); Wy. Stat. Ann. §§ 20-18,
19 (1957). North Dakota repealed its miscegenation law (N.D. Rev. Code
§ 14-0304 (1943) in 1955. (Laws of N.D. 1955, ch. 126 § 1).
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these statutes have necessarily led to their application in the
area of public policy.19 The courts of these jurisdictions have
held void marriages of their domiciliaries even though the mis-
cegenous marriage was valid in the jurisdiction where con-
tracted.20 However, it is necessarily implied that the parties
to the marriage were, at the time of the marriage, domiciliar-
ies of the forum, for the miscegenation laws are not construed
to have extra-territorial effect.2 1 Though the forum may pro-
hibit miscegenous marriages, a valid marriage contracted in
another state when the parties were not residents of the forum
will be recognized as valid.2 2 This validation includes situa-
tions where the parties had been previously domiciled in the
forum but married out of state, set up a new domicil, and later
returned to the forum. 23
With the decision of the California Supreme Court in Perez
v. Sharp24 declaring California's miscegenation law unconsti-
tutional the public policy embodied in such statutes might well
be considered doubtful. Yet two Southern courts have since
upheld the constitutionality of local miscegenation laws.2 -
Incestuous Marriages. Prohibitions against marriages con-
sidered incestuous by reason of consanguinity (blood relation-
19. "I do not hesitate to say that it (the Georgia miscegenation law)
was dictated by wise statesmanship, and has a broad and solid foundation
in enlightened policy, sustained by reason and common sense. The amalga-
mation of the races is not only unnatural but it is always productive of
deplorable results. Our daily observations show us that the offspring of
these unnatural connections are generally sickly and effeminate, and that
they are inferior in physical development and strength to the full blood
of either race... (These marriages). . . are productive of evil, and evil
only, without any corresponding good." Georgia v. Tutty, 41 Fed. 753 (C.C.
Ga. 1890) citing Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321. The biological analysis may have
been refuted but the strong feeling remains. (See Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 30,
37, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (1955)).
20. Stevens v. United States, 146 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1944); Re Takahashi,
113 Mont. 490, 129 P.2d 217 (1942); State v. Kennedy, 76 N.C. 251, 22 Am.
Rep. 683 (1877); Eggers v. Olson, 104 Okla. 297, 231 Pac. 483 (1924); Naim
v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955).
21. Re Takahashi, supra note 20 (The statute's application must neces-
sarily be limited to marriages contracted while the parties remained
domiciliaries of Montana); Miller v. Lucks, 36 So. 2d 140 (Miss. 1948) (The
miscegenation law has no extra-territorial effect.).
22. People v. Godines, 17 Cal. App. 2d 721, 62 P.2d 787 (1936); Whitting-
ton v. McCaskill, 65 Fla. 162, 61 So. 236 (1913); Miller v. Lucks, 36 So. 2d
140 (Miss. 1948); State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242, 22 Am. Rep. 678 (1877); but
see State v. Bell, 7 Baxt. (Tenn.) 9, 32 Am. Rep. 549 (1872) (Invalidation
of the marriage when the parties were apparently not residents of Ten-
nessee).
23. State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242, 22 Am. Rep. 678 (1877).
24. 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17, 29 (1948) "In summary, we hold that
sections 60 and 69 are not only too vague and uncertain to be enforce-
able regulations of a fundamental right, but that they violate the equal
protection of the laws clause of the United States Constitution by impair-
ing the right of individuals to marry on the basis of race alone and by
arbitrarily and unreasonably discriminating against certain racial groups."
25. Jackson v. State, 37 Ala. App. 519, 72 So. 2d 114 (1954) cert. den. 260
Ala. 698, 72 So. 2d 116 (1954) cert. den. 348 U.S. 888 (1954); Naim v. Naim,
197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955).
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ship) or affinity (relationship by marriage) have a long his-
tory. The common law source can be found in the proscrip-
tions of the levitical decrees which begin with the colorful
language: "None of you shall approach to any that is near of
kin to him, to uncover their nakedness ...,"2 The levitical de-
crees included the relationship of affinity as well as consang-
uinity and the foreign marriage of those related by marriage
was found invalid in England.27 However questions of affinity
never received serious condemnation in the United States and
therefore a valid foreign marriage contrary to such a statutory
restriction has been generally upheld in the forum.2 1 As to
consanguinity the courts in like situations have more willingly
applied either the "law of nature" or "public policy" excep-
tions to marriages of their domiciliaries. In the majority of
such instances the exceptions were found not applicable and
the marriage was upheld. 29
Of considerable importance in such cases is the working of
the prohibition statute. Such statements as "shall be absolute-
ly void" impress the courts as more likely expressions of strong
local policy than mere general prohibitions.30 However, even
strong statutory language is insufficient to allow a court to
disallow a foreign marriage of parties not domiciled in the
forum at the time of the marriage.31
Polygamous Marriages. Story stated that polygamous or
"non-Christian" marriages were one exception to the rule that
26. Leviticus 18:6.
27. E. g., Brook v. Brook, 9 H.L.C. 193 (1861) held invalid the marriage
of a man to his deceased wife's sister while in Denmark. The statute in re-
gard to such marriages was changed in 1907 however. (6 Edw. VII c. 47
§ 1).
28. Dannelli v. Dannelli, 67 Ky. 51 (1868); Tyler v. Andrews, 40 App.
D.C. 100 (1913). But ef. Osinach v. Watkins, 235 Ala. 564, 180 So. 577 (1938)
Here the court found the incestuous marriage statutes to be sufficiently
ferocious to indicate a public policy invalidating the marriage of a man to
his uncle's widow.
29. Finsterward v. Burk, 129 Md. 131, 98 Atl. 358 (1916) cert. den. 248 U.S.
292 (1918) (uncle-niece marriage); In re Miller's Estate. 239 Mich. 455. 214
N.W. 428 (1927) (first cousins); Mazzolini v. Mazzolini. 168 Ohio St. 357,
155 N.E.2d 206 (1958) (first cousins). Contra, Bucca v. State. 43 N.J. Super.
315, 128 A.2d 506 (1957); see also Mortenson v. Mortenson, 83 Ariz. 87. 316
P.2d 1106 (1957) (marriage evasion statute); Meisenhelder v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry. Co., 170 Minn. 317, 213 N.W. 32 (1927) (marriage evasion statute).
30. See Bucca v. State, supra note 29. Under a statute declaring such a
marriage "absolutely void" a foreign marriage was nullified. In In re Mil-
ler's Estate, supra note 29, under a general statutory prohibition the for-
eign marriage was upheld. In Mazzolini v. Mazzolini, 168 Ohio St. 357, 155
N.E.2d 206 (1958) the same result was reached.
31. Garcia v. Garcia, 25 S.D. 645, 127 N.W. 586 (1910). The South Dakota
statute declared such a union "incestuous and void from the beginning".
The court refused to allow this expression of public policy to void the
marriage. The forum could not declare a marriage void by the law of their
present domicil when both the domicil at the time of the marriage and
the place where the marriage was contracted were foreign jurisdictions.
See also Meisenhelder v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 170 Minn. 317, 213 N.W.
32 (1927).
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a marriage valid where performed is valid everywhere.2 This
statement of the first authority in the field has been often re-
peated by the courts but found little place for actual applica-
tion. In England it has been held that such unions are not
valid "marriages". 33 Yet in the United States recognition has
been accorded the informal, often polygamous, marriages of
various Indian tribes.34 In fact, Hindu and Moslem marriages
which were "potentially polygamous", in that the husband
could take another wife but had not yet done so, have been
given full credit in the United States.3. With the progressive
internationalization of our society the problem will become less
academic. An adequate solution will require more than narrow
moral pretensions and likely will entail recognition of such
marriages.
Common Law Marriages. Marriage by the common law
forms was of two types: per verba de presenti (by present
agreement to be married) and per verba de futuro cum copula
(by agreement on future marriage coupled with subsequent
sexual intercourse). The distinctions have tended to become
lost in their American application. Yet at latest count seven-
teen states and the District of Columbia recognize the "com-
mon law" or nonceremonial marriage in some form.3 6 Thirty-
three states refuse it recognition. 37 Among students of the
subject, including the American Bar Association and the Com-
mission on Uniform State Laws, there is impressive unanim-
ity for its abolition.3 8
32. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 113(a) (8th ed. 1883). See also Earle
v. Earle, 141 App. Div. 611, 126 N.Y.S. 317 (1910).
33. In re Bethell, 38 Ch. Div. 220 (Eng. 1889).
34. Yakima Joe v. To-is-Lap, 191 Fed. 516 (C.C.D. Ore. 1910); Moore v.
Jackson Iron Co., 76 Mich. 498, 43 N.W. 602, 605 (1889) 'While most civilized
nations in our day very wisely discard polygamy . . . yet it is a recognized
and valid institution among many nations, and in no way universally un-
lawful." See generally GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 120 (3rd ed.
1949).
35. Application of Sood, 142 N.Y.S.2d 591 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (Hindo mar-
riage); Royal v. Cudahy Packing Co., 195 Iowa 759, 190 N.W. 427 (1922)
(Mohammedan marriage-potentially polygamous-upheld).
36. Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas,
Michigan, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas. JACOBS AND GOEBEL, DOMESTIC RELA-
TIONS 93 (4th ed. 1961).
37. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illin-
ois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minn-
esota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jer-
sey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Ten-
nessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
Wyoming. JACOBS & GOEBEL, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 93 (4th ed. 1961).
See Schumacher v. G.N. Ry. Co., 23 N.D. 231, 136 N.W. 85 (1912) as to the
status of common law marriage in North Dakota.
38. See GROVES, THE CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN FAMILY 540-541
(1947) "The common law union debases conventional marriage and encour-
ages deceit and vice . . . So long as common law marriage is recognized,
there is opportunity for blackmail and for a woman who has been mistress
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In a jurisdiction not recognizing common law marriage such
a marriage contracted outside the state is usually given recog-
nition by applying the general rule and the lex loci celebra-
tionis.5 Where the parties are domiciliaries and go outside the
state to contract the marriage, returning without a change of
domicil, the marriage may be held void.4 0 The result may be
based upon local public policy or a local statute declaring such
marriages void. 4 1 There is, even so, strong authority for up-
holding the marriage under these circumstances.42
There is also a problem with regard to cohabitation and
holding out to the public as man and wife. Some courts feel
these are essential to a common law marriage, while others
consider them only evidentiary. If cohabitation is an essential
part of the form both the exchange of consents and cohabita-
tion must be in a state recognizing common law marriage.' 3 If
cohabitation and repute are merely evidentiary then their
locus can make no difference.4 4 Since it is usually difficult to
determine whether the holding out is evidentiary or substan-
tive very casual contacts with a state have been held to vali-
date such a marriage.45
Marriages by Proxy or Correspondence. "A corollary of the
classical doctrine that consensus is sufficient to bring into be-
ing the marriage rplqtion has been the principle, long seated in
civil law countries, that a valid marriage can be celebrated by
proxy."4 6 Marriage by correspondence is, in effect, merely a
variation of the proxy situation with the added difficulty that
no solemnization can take place. The proxy marriage 4  and
of a man to claim after his death a share of his estate as his legal wife.
It Is also true that when the court decides that there has been a common
law marriage, a later union of one of the two concerned is rendered biga-
mous, and if any children have been born they become illegitimate."
39. Tatum v. Tatum, 241 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1957); Pierce v. Pierce, 399
Ill. 185, 39 N.E.2d 990 (1942); Gilbert v. Gilbert, 275 Ky. 559, 122 S.W.2d 137(1938) (dictum); Shea v. Shea, 294 N.Y. 909, 63 N.E.2d 113 (1945); Abbott v.
Industrial Commission, 80 Ohio App. 7, 74 N.E.2d 625 (1946); RESTATE-
MENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 123 (1944).
40. In re Veta's Estate, 110 Utah 187, 170 P.2d 183 (1946); In re Van
Schaick's Etate, 256 Wis. 214, 40 N.W.2d 588 (1949) (evasion statute).
41. If the local marriage is declared void § 132(d) of the Restatement
may be applied to invalidate it as to domiciliaries.
42. Tatum v. Tatum, 241 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1957); Shea v. Shea, supra
note 39.
43. Ferraro v. Ferraro, 77 N.Y.S.2d 246 (Dom.Rel. Ct. 1948).
44. Brown's Adm's v. Brown, 308 Ky. 796, 215 S.W.2d 971 (1948); Fran-
zen v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 130 N.J.L. 457, 33 A.2d 599 (Sup.Ct. 1943).
45. Madwell v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 329 (E.D. Tenn. 1949) (living
for several months); In re Singer's Estate, 138 N.Y.S.2d 740 (Surr.Ct. 1955)(honeymooning). See also Gilbert v. Gilbert, 275 Ky. 559, 122 S.W.2d 137
(1938) (short visit).
46. JACOBS & GOEBEL, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 120 (4th ed. 1961).
47. In re Valente's Will, 18 Misc. 2d 701, 188 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1959); United
States v. Layton, 68 F. Supp. 247 (S.D. Fla. 1946); Hardin v. Davis, 16 Ohio
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marriage by correspondence4s have been held valid in several
jurisdictions and are probably valid in many others. There is
authority for holding them valid in any jurisdiction which rec-
ognizes common law marriage.49 But those courts requiring
cohabitation for recognition of common law marriages would
hardly be satisfied. The applicable law under the marriage by
proxy is the lex loci celebrationis,0 for marriage by correspon-
dence, the law of the state from which the acceptance is dis-
patched.5 1 If the marriage is valid by that law it should be
valid everywhere.2
Eugenic Restrictions. For centuries a valid marriage has
been based upon certain requisites of form and substance. The
present trend, for eugenic, social or economic reasons is to add
certain other requirements before a marriage can be legally
established. The two subsequent sections view additional re-
strictions on age and remarriage. This section will concern
itself with those health restrictions which more and more
states have found necessary for the welfare of their present
and future citizens.53 Such marriage laws have been construed
as having no extra-territorial effect 54 particularly since they
seldom declare such a marriage void. 55 Yet in a foreign mar-
riage of its domiciliaries where both states involved had pro-
hibitions regarding the marriage of epileptics, the Supreme
Supp. 19 (1945). See United States v. Barrons, 91 F. Supp. 319 (N.D. Cal.
1950).
48. Great Northern Ry. v. Johnson, 254 Fed. 683 (8th Cir. 1918).
49. United States v. Layton, supra note 47.
50. Ferraro v. Ferraro, 77 N.Y.S.2d 246 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1948); United
States v. Barrons, supra note 47; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §
124 (1934).
51. United States v. Layton, 68 F. Supp. 247 (S.D. Fla. 1946); RESTATE-
MENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS 8 125 (1934).
52. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS 88 124, 125 (1934).
53. E.g. N.D. Cent. Code 8 14-03-12 (1961) requires a serological test
for syphilis. "No person who is so afflicted is entitled to marry." N.D. Cent.
Code § 14-03-07: "Marriage by woman under the age of 45 years or by a
man of any age unless he marries a woman over the age of 45 years is
prohibited if such a man or woman is a chronic alcoholic, an habitual
criminal, an imbecile, a feebleminded person, an idiot, an insane person, a
person who has been afflicted with hereditary insanity or with any con-
tagious venereal disease."
54. Lyannes v. Lyannes, 177 Wis. 381, 177 N.W. 683 (1920). See also
Johnson v. Johnson, 104 N.W.2d 8 (N.D. 1960) where a North Dakota res-
ident and alcoholic married in Minnesota. The court applied North Dakota
law under the evasion statute then upheld the marriage on the question
of unsound mind without considering the eugenic question.
55. Boysen v. Boysen, 301 Ill. App. 573. 23 N.E.2d 231, 234, (1939): "In
Illinois the general rule is that unless the statute expressly declares a
marriage contracted without the necessary consent of the parties, or other
requirements of the statute, to be a nullity, such statutes will be construed
as directory only . . . the marriage is valid although disobedience of the
statute may entail penalties on the licensing or officiating authorities."
The same general practice of validating the marriage but penalizing the
violator prevails in Europe. Mueller, International Choice of Law to Deter-
mine the Validity of Marriages. Howard L.J. 21, 25-27 (1956).
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Court of Wisconsin voided the marriage on a public policy
basis.c
Remarriage Restrictions. In an attempt at eliminating the
"progressive polygamy" occasioned by divorce followed by
immediate remarriage - often apparently ad infinitum - a
majority of the states have enacted statutes limiting the right
to marry again.5 Though there is great variation in detail
the two general methods involve (1) postponing the decree of-
ficially dissolving the divorce for purposes of remarriage (2)
a prohibition against remarriage for a stated period. The
limitation may apply to both parties or to guilty party alone
and may also be discretionary with the trial judge. 58 Where
the divorce decree is conditional or interlocutory and to be-
come final after a stated period remarriage in another state
during this period is void.59 The reasoning is simple-the ori-
ginal parties are still married and the subsequent marriage is
bigamous. However the distinction may often be very narrow-
ly drawn between an interlocutory effect and a prohibition. GO
Where a domiciliary of the forum remarries in another
state contrary to the provisions of a prohibitionary statute or
decree the courts are in disagreement as to the validity of the
marriage.1 The question of validity of the marriage even if
contracted within the state is essentially one of statutory in-
terpretation. "[T] he marriage itself is not void unless the stat-
56. Kitzman v. Kitzman, 167 Wis. 308, 166 N.W. 789 (1918). With the
present state of medical knowledge concerning epilepsy this would seem a
doubtful public policy.
57. See generally II VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 92
(1931) & Supp. (1948).
58. E.g. N.D. Cent. Code § 14-05-02 (1961): "The effect of a judgment
decreeing a divorce is to restore the parties to the state of unmarried per-
sons, but neither party to a divorce may marry except in accordance with
the decree of the court granting the divorce. It shall be the duty of the
court granting a divorce to specify in the order for judgment whether
either or both of the parties shall be permitted to marry, and if so, when.
The court shall have jurisdiction to modify the decree of divorce at any
time so as to permit one or both of the parties to marry, if in his discretion
he shall deem it right."
59. Brand v. State, 242 Ala. 15, 6 So. 2d 446 (1941); Earle v. Earle, 141,
App. Div. 611, 126 N.Y.S. 317 (1910); Atkinson v. Sovereign Camp, 90 Okla.
154, 216 Pac. 467 (1923); Heflinger v. Heflinger, 136 Va. 289, 118 S.E. 316
(1923); White v. White, 167 Wis. 615, 168 N.W. 704 (1918). Cf. Baker v.
Abrhams, 73 Colo. 515, 216 Pac. 259 (1923).
60. No Reference-Eliminated by printer to expedite production.
61. The following hold the marriage void: Lanham v. Lanham, 136 Wis.
360, 117 N.W. 787 (1908) (statutory prohibition against remarriage for one
year); Harvey v. State, 31 Okla. Cr. App. 229, 238 Pac. 863 (1925) (dictum)
(6 month statutory prohibition against remarriage); Mauer v. Mauer, 163
Pa. Super. 264, 60 A.2d 440 (1948) (prohibition against remarriage to para-
mour). The following hold the marriage valid: Loughran v. Loughran, 292
U.S. 216, (1933) (prohibition against remarriage of guilty party); In re
Palmer's Estate, 192 Misc. 385, 79 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1949) (prohibition against
remarriage to paramour).
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ute itself so makes it.. ." Logically this should be the first req-
uisite for invalidating a foreign marriage. Yet the courts
have held such foreign marriages void under the magic phrase
"public policy" with a mere general prohibition in the statute.6 3
The most consistent rule to be gathered from the cases is: if
the statute merely declares remarriage prohibited-as oppos-
ed to void-the extra-territorial marriage is valid.6 4 Where
the marriage is expressly declared void, the out of state mar-
riage is invalid.65 In thus validating the marriage the courts
offer as reasoning that the statute does not purport to be ex-
tra-territorial in effect and that it simply does not declare the
marriage void. In voiding a marriage the courts once again
apply "public policy".
While most of the above discussion relates to situations
where the court of the domicil is considering the validity of an
out of state marriage of its domiciliaries, a subsequent state
where the parties are domiciled may also rule on validity and
should base its decision on the law of the domicil of the par-
ties at the time of the marriage.66
Nonage. The problem of under age marriage together with
the remarriage restriction have created the greatest bulk of
conflicts litigation in this area. Youthful marriage and its rel-
ative increase have become more and more of a social prob-
lem. The distinction to be gleaned from the cases in this area
is a stronger emphasis upon the ever-present presumption of
validity as to a purported marriage.
In the usual situation, under age residents of the forum
marry in another state with lower age requirements and then
return. Here the court of the domicil will usually apply the
62. Plummer v. Davies, 169 Okla. 374, 36 P.2d 938 (1934) (This case
analyzes the various statutory provisions); Horton v. Horton, 22 Ariz. 490,
198 Pac. 1105 (1921); Dudley v. Dudley, 151 Iowa 142, 130 N.W. 485 (1911);
Fisch v. Marler, 1 Wash. 2d 698, 97 P.2d 147 (1934).
63. Maurer v. Maurer, 163 Pa. Super. 264, 60 A.2d 440 (1948) (marriage
to paramour). Note that in In re Palmer's Estate, 192 Misc. 385, 79 N.Y. S.2d
404 (1949) an exactly opposite result was reached, even though the mar-
riage took place in Pennsylvania.
64. Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, (1933); Horton v. Horton, 22
Ariz. 490, 198 Pac. 1105 (1921); Griswold v. Griswold, 23 Colo. App. 365, 129
Pac. 560 (1913); Dudley v. Dudley, 151 Iowa 142, 130 N.W. 485 (1911); In re
Kinkead's Estate, 239 Minn. 27, 57 N.W.2d 628 (1953); Fisch v. Marler, 1
Wash. 2d 698, 97 P.2d 147 (1934). But see note 62.
65. In re Kinkead's Estate, supra note 64; Harvey v. State, 31 Okla. Cr.
App. 229, 238 Pac. 862 (1925) (dictum); Hall v. Industrial Commission, 165
Wis. 364, 162 N.W. 312 (1917).
66. Hall v. Industrial Commission, supra note 65 (applying Illinois law
since the public policy was the same); Fisch v. Marler, 1 Wash. 2d 698, 97
P.2d 147 (1934) (applied and construed Idaho law).
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general rule of lex loci celebrationis and uphold the marriage.7
This rule has even been extended to situations where the stat-
ute of the forum declared such marriages "absolutely void".us
Another method of validation is through a finding that the
law of the forum is directory only.G9 That minority of jurisdic-
tions which would invalidate these marriages hold the ques-
tion to be decided by the law of the domicil.- They color their
argument with a tinge of public policy.
In those cases where one or both of the parties were under
age at the place where the marriage was contracted but of age
at the domicil the courts have also found means to uphold the
marriage. The usual finding is that the marriage was merely
voidable where contracted and does not meet the annulment
requirements of the forum.7 1 It is also possible that local pub-
lic policy evidenced by the age statute might be applied to vali-
date such a marriage. 72 One author has analyzed the courts'
approach to nonage marriages as an alternative reference
method for upholding them.
7 3
While the American cases seldom differentiate between
minimum marriageable age and lack of parental consent,7 4 in
England a distinction has been made. Marriageable age is a
question of capacity to be governed by the law of the husband's
domicil.7 5 Parental consent is classified as a question of form,
to be governed by the law of the place where the marriage was
contracted."
EVASION STATUTES
The problem of evasion of the domicil's laws through out-
67. State v. Graves, 228, Ark, 378, 307 S.W.2d 545 (1957); McDonald v.
McDonald, 6 Cal. 2d 457, 58 P.2d 163, (1936); Payne v. Payne, 121 Colo. 212,
214 P.2d 495 (1950); Mangrum v. Mangrum, 310 Ky. 226, 220 S.W.2d 406
(1949). See also Levy v. Downing, 213 Mass. 334, 100 N.E. 638 (1913).
68. State v. Graves, supra note 67.
69. Needam v. Needam, 183 Va. 681, 33 S.E.2d 288 (1943).
70. Wilkins v. Zelichowski, 26 N.J. 370, 140 A.2d 288 (1943); Mitchell v.
Mitchell, 63 Misc. 580, 117 N.Y.S. 671 (1909); Ross v. Bryant, 90 Okla. 300,
217 Pac. 364 (1923).
71. Capossa v. Calonna, 95 N.J.Eq. 35, 122 Atl. 378 (Ch. 1923) aff'd 96
N.J.Eq. 385 N.J.Eq. 385, 124 Atl. 760 (1924); Parks v. Parks, 218 N.C. 245,
10 S.E.2d 807 (1940) (concurring opinion); Portwood v. Portwood, 109 S.W.
2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (The annulment of a voidable marriage like
divorce is governed by the law of the domicile). Contra, Cruickshank v.
Cruickshank, 82 N.Y.S.2d 522 (Sup.Ct. 1948).
72. See DeFur v. DeFur, 156 Tenn. 634, 4 S.W.2d 341 (1928). The lower
courts upheld the marriage on the basis of public policy but since the
statutory age had been raised in the interim, the Supreme Court reversed.
73. Note, Choice of Law In Annulment for Non-age, 49 Colum. L. Rev.
693, 695 (1949).
74. But see, Needam v. Needam, 183 Va. 681, 33 S.E.2d 288 (1943) hold-
ing the parental consent requirement directory only.
75. Pugh v. Pugh, Prob. 482, 2 All Eng. 680 (1951).
76. Ogden v. Ogden, Prob. 46 (Eng. 1908).
1962]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
of-state marriages was early recognized. Various states at-
tempted statutory solutions and, in their usual effort toward
unanimity, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ap-
proved a Uniform Marriage Evasion Law (U.M.E.L.) in the
year 1912. The Act was subsequently adopted in only five
states.77 The Commissioners withdrew the Act in 1943 since
so few states had adopted it as to multiply rather than curb
confusion.7 s The Act operates to nullify out of state marriages
by a resident where the marriage would be declared void if
contracted within the state.7 9 The converse is also applied to
nullify marriages by nonresidents within the state when their
domicil declares such a marriage void.8
In addition, a substantial number of states have varying
marriage evasion statutes,,1 often applying the principle used
in the first section of the U.M.E.A. However, those statutes
directly following the Uniform Act do not have the wide reach
originally thought since they apply only to marriages "de-
clared void" by the domicil. Thus, an extra-state marriage con-
trary to local licensing, eugenics, incestual marriage, or non-
age statutes may still be upheld in the domicil s2 unless it is
expressly declared void. 3 Where the evasion statute uses broad-
er language its application may be extended beyond these stat-
utorily "void" marriages.
4
77. Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Vermont, Wisconsin.
78. See JACOBS & GOEBEL, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 72 (4th ed. 1961)
for further explanation.
79. U.M.E.A. § 1.
80. Id., § 2.
81. See e.g. N.D. Cent. Code § 14-03-08 (1961): "All marriages contracted
outside of this state, which are valid according to the laws of the state or
country where contracted, shall be valid in this state. This section shall
not apply when residents of this state contract a marriage in another state
which is prohibited under the laws of North Dakota." See I VERNIER,
FAMILY LAWS § 45 (1931) listing 17 states and the District of Columbia
as having some form of evasion statute.
82. Boysen v. Boysen, 301 Ill. App. 573, 23 N.E.2d 231 (1934) (eugenics
requirement); Levy v. Downing, 213 Mass. 334, 100 N.E. 638 (1913) (non-
age); Mazzolini v. Mazzolini, 168 Ohio St. 357, 155 N.E.2d 206 (1958) (inces-
tual marriage); Lyannes v. Lyannes, 137 Wis. 381, 177 N.W. 683 (1920)
(eugenics and licensing law).
83. Meisenhelder v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 179 Minn. 317, 213 N.W. 32
(1927) (incestual marriage).
84. See e.g. Mortenson v. Mortenson, 83 Ariz. 87, 316 P.2d 1106 (1957)
(The statute read: ". . . marriages solemnized in any other state or country
by parties intending at the time to reside in this state shall have the same
legal consequences and effect as if solemnized in this state . . ."); John-
son v. Johnson, 114 N.W.2d 8 (N.D. 1960); First National Bank v. N.D. Work-
men's Compensation Bureau, 63 N.W.2d 661, 663 (N.D. 1960): "A state has
the prerogative to regulate by legislation the marital status of its citizens
domiciled therein to the extent of prohibiting certain marriages upon the
ground of public policy and may give effect to such prohibition in nullify-




THE INCIDENTS OF MARRIAGE
It should be observed that separate from consideration of
marriage validity there is opportunity for state control of the
incidents of marriage." These interests arising from the mar-
riage "status" are subject to control by the law of the state
in which the incident is claimed. In the words of the Restate-
ment:
"If any effect of a marriage created by the law of one
state is deemed by the courts of another state sufficiently
offensive to the policy of the latter state, the latter state
will refuse to give that effect to the marriage. ' '11
In this manner, parties validly married and domiciled in one
jurisdiction, upon moving to another state may find them-
selves subject to criminal prosecution for illicit cohabitation.87
In addition to these incestuous and miscegenous prosecutions
there is authority for denial of emancipation from guardian-
ship where the minor validly marries in another state. 18 How-
ever, even the authority who has made the most exhaustive
search and coverage of this area has failed to uncover more
than a sprinkling of cases supporting this concept of restric-
tions upon the incidents of marriage. 9 There appear to be no
recent cases effectuating this stand, and those cases of ancient
lineage which provide the authority seem of limited applica-
tion.
On the question of policy alone it would seem doubtful that
such harsh restrictions as denial of cohabitation and emancipa-
tion should be attached to a valid marriage. The insta nces
where such restrictions might reasonably be applied do
not come readily to mind. In most circumstances it would ap-
pear that judicial decision as to validity of the marriage would
be adequate solution. If a denial of personal or property rights
is involved there should also arise the question and the limita-
tion of equal protection of the law.
85. See generally, Taintor, What Law Governs the Ceremony, Incidents
and Status of Marriage, 19 B.U.L. Rev. 353, 357-366 (1939).
86. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 134 (1934).
87. State v. Brown, 47 Ohio St. 102, 33 N.E. 747 (1890) (prosecution for
incest was proper though the marriage was valid where celebrated) State
v. Bell, 66 Tenn. 9 (1872) (allowed prosecution for illicit cohabitation
though miscegenous marriage valid where celebrated).
88. Guillebert v. Grenier, 107 La. 614, 32 So. 238 (1902).
89. Taintor, What Law Governs the Ceremony, Incidents and Status
of Marriage, 19 B.U.L. Rev. 353, 357-366 (1939); Taintor, Marriage in the
Conflict of Laws, 9 Vand. L. Rev. 607, 614-616 (1956).
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
While there is among the cases on the subject of marriage
in the conflict of laws a strand of agreement, it is often long
in the finding. Conflicting reasoning is applied even when the
same result is reached and results finding substantial agree-
ment in one area may not carry over into the next. The most
consistent finding is an application of the presumption of
validity as to a purported marriage. The courts are reluctant
to negate a relationship upon which so many personal and gov-
ernmental considerations depend. The usual basis for invalid-
ation, "public policy", is in effect an admission of judicial fail-
ure. Judicial analysis has been able to refine the question no
further than this broad term. That concept itself has been
criticized as "an intolerable affection of superior virtue." 90 In
the words of Judge Goodrich: ". . . the sight of the courts of
one state refusing to apply the law of another because the sec-
ond state's rule shocks the morals of the forum, is one to make
the judicious grieve." 91 This concept is more than an excep-
tion. In its broad application it strikes at the foundations of
conflicts law. It is reversion to territorial sovereignty.
The attempt at re-analysis of this area has led authorities
to the earlier mentioned "intended marital domicil" rule.9 2 In
the tentative drafts of the second Restatement of Conflict of
Laws a more closely reasoned model of this rule has found ex-
pression. Stated in essence, it is as follows:
"A marriage is invalid everywhere, even though the
requirements of the state where the marriage took place
have been complied with, if it is invalid under the law of a
state where at least one of the parties is domiciled at the
time of the marriage and where both intend to make their
home thereafter." 93
The rule and its converse application are more variously
given in other sections yet the essence of it is as stated above.
The problem is broken down to its basic factor-that state
having paramount interest in the relationship should govern
its validity. The solution is similar to that found necessary by
the American Law Institute in its second Restatement on Con-
90. Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights 27 Yale L.
J. 656, 662 (1918).
91. Goodrich, Foreign Facts and Local Fancies, 25 Va. L. Rev. 26, 35
(1938).
92. See note 13 supra.
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 134 (Tent.
Draft no. 4 1957).
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tracts. The validity of a contract is to be determined by the
law of the state with which the contract has the most signifi-
cant relationship. 4 That rule has also operated under the
terminology of the "points of contact" or "center of gravity"
rule as to contracts. The underlying logic is the same: the law
of that state most affected should govern.
The rule as enunciated above has found no exact expression
in the cases, but the principle involved has gained much sup-
port 5 The marriage evasion statutes embody this concept of
the paramount interest of the state in which the parties are
domiciled and will be domiciled. The Arizona statute in fact
expressly adopts an "intended marital domicil" rule.
The effect engendered through recognition of this rule
would not be greatly different than present judicial decision
in the various areas discussed. The effect would be closer
judicial analysis of the actual interests involved and a more
clealf and uniform recognition of an institution necessitating
certainty rather than interstate judicial dispute.
J. PHILIP JOHNSON
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONTRACTS § 332 (Tent. Draft no. 6
1960).
95. Stevens v. United States, 146 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1944) (Residents of
the state of Oklahoma intending to return could not avoid the miscegenous
marriage prohibition by their Kansas marriage.); Wilkins v. Zelichowskt,
26 N.J. 370, 140 A.2d 65 (1958) (A marriage of underage New Jersey resi-
dents In Indiana upon return to New Jersey as their marital domicil wouldbe invalidated.); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 63 Misc. 580, 117 N.Y.S. 671, 674 (1909)
"The relation established by the marriage was not to be sustained in Can-
ada, but In New York. It was intended by the parties to be carried out In
the state of New York, and such contract as they made may be said tohave been made by them with the view and expectation that the mutual
obligations imposed should be subject to the laws of this state so far as
those laws authorized a dissolution of the marriage ties by judicial pro-
ceeding for any cause. The marriage domicil of the parties is to determine
the question as to whether a divorce or annulment shall be had."; Ross v.Bryant, 90 Okla. 300, 217 Pac. 364 (1923) (invalidation of marriage of re-
turning domiciliaries); see generally Annot. 71 A.L.R.2d 687, 690-691 (1957).
96. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-112 (1956) "B. Marriages solemnized in
another state or country by parties intending at the time to reside in this
state shall have the same legal consequences and effect as if solemnized
in this state."
19621
